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1. Introduction
This chapter investigates the problem of the unity of objects from the point of view of 
an ontology that posits only instances of physical powers (e.g. mass, spin, charge) at the 
fundamental level of reality.1, 2 The account I put forward is a neo-Aristotelian one. 
One of the keystones of Aristotle’s metaphysics is his hylomorphism, the view (as 
I interpret it) that objects are unified wholes analysable in their component matter and 
form. In my understanding of Aristotle, matter and form are holistically rather than 
mereologically composed in a hylomorphic composite.3 I submit that Aristotle had 
philosophically sound insights on holistic composition; on the other hand, he also 
assumed that a whole is ipso facto metaphysically one. It is with this assumption that 
I take issue in this chapter. By contrast with Aristotle, I distinguish being a whole and 
being metaphysically one; and I give in this chapter arguments for such distinction. 
I show how powers may combine in both ways, into wholes, and further, into meta-
physical unities.
For the sake of building my neo-Aristotelian approach on firm foundations, in 
this chapter I also engage with E. J. Lowe’s critique of Aristotle’s hylomorphism. Lowe, 
while often declaring how inspirational Aristotle was for his own work, considers 
Aristotle’s key doctrine of hylomorphism unable to meet, in his words, ‘the challenge 
of explaining how a new substance is brought into existence’ when matter and form 
1 The preparation of this chapter benefited from a fellowship at the Paris Institute for Advanced 
Studies (France), with the financial support of the French State, managed by the Agence Nationale de la 
Recherche, programme ‘Investissements d’avenir’ (ANR-11-LABX-0027-01 Labex RFIEA+). The chapter 
draws (verbatim in some sections) on two previously published papers of mine: ‘Aristotle’s hylomorphism 
without reconditioning’, Philosophical Inquiry,Volume 37, Issue 1/2, 2013, pp. 5–22; and ‘Power mereology: 
structural versus substantial powers’, in M. P. Paoletti and F. Orilia (eds.), Philosophical and Scientific 
Perspectives on Downward Causation, Routledge, 2017, pp. 110–27.
2 I have argued for such ontology in my ‘Power mereology: structural versus substantial powers’, in 
M. P. Paoletti and F. Orilia (eds.), Philosophical and Scientific Perspectives on Downward Causation, 
Routledge, 2017.
3 There is much controversy in the literature as to how to interpret Aristotle’s view; for reasons of space 
here I can only state my own interpretation and refer the reader to my ‘Aristotle’s hylomorphism without 
reconditioning’, Philosophical Inquiry,Volume 37, Issue 1/2, 2013, pp. 5–22, which includes also a review of 
some modern interpretations of Aristotle’s views.
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combine (2012, 236). In response, I show that Lowe had not captured the essence of 
Aristotle’s theory of holistic composition, and that his ‘reconditioned’ version of the 
theory does not fare well in addressing the very question that Lowe thinks Aristotle 
failed to address successfully.
2. Lowe’s Critique of Aristotle’s Holism
In his analysis of Aristotle’s hylomorphism Lowe concentrates on what he identifies as 
its main desideratum, which is ‘to justify the judgement that a new concrete object—an 
“addition of being”—really has been brought into existence, rather than some previ-
ously existing things merely being re-arranged’ (2012, 236). Lowe interprets Aristotle 
as accounting for the emergence of a new entity by positing that matter and form, the 
parts of an object, are (in a Fregean fashion) ‘incomplete entities’. According to Lowe, 
what allows for the emergence of a new unified object is the mutual ‘saturation’ of its 
parts. No additional metaphysical glue is needed; it is the incomplete nature of the 
parts that secures that they get unified. Lowe characterizes the view thus:
The key point is that, on this view, individual substances exhibit ‘internal’ ontological com-
plexity, being combinations of ‘incomplete’ entities that are completed by each other in the 
substance. (2012, 231)
Lowe explains this (supposedly) Aristotelian account of the unity of substance through 
the incompleteness of its parts thus:
unless we can see the new substance as being a combination of items neither of which can exist 
independently of the other in just such a combination, rather than as merely being composed 
of other independently existing things, each possessing their own features, we shall be unable 
to justify the judgement that a new concrete object . . . really has been brought into existence. 
(2012, 235)
Lowe finds this (putative) Aristotelian view problematic; I take it, on the ground that 
incompleteness is an unexplained concept:
What I don’t understand is what it means to say that the completed house’s form—the way in 
which its ‘matter’ is organized—is an ‘incomplete’ constituent of the house which ‘combines’ 
together with that equally ‘incomplete’ matter to constitute the house, a complete substance. 
(2012, 236)
I agree with Lowe that what he describes here would not offer an explanation of how a 
substance is a new entity, rather than a mereological sum of its parts arranged in a cer-
tain way. There is no reason anyone should expect that two incomplete entities could 
make up a complete whole over and above the sum of its parts; for instance, half a pear 
and half an orange do not make up a whole fruit. But the two parts of a drawbridge over 
a river do make up a complete bridge. Why? Because of their complementarity. This is 
the sense in which, each on its own, is incomplete. Complementary entities complete 
each other on account of what is achieved when they complement one another. For 
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Aristotle, the wholesomeness of the achievement is what licenses the description of the 
contributing entities as incomplete. Complementary entities may be either existentially 
independent of each other, like a peg and a bookshelf; or dependent on each other, like 
quarks (which cannot exist on their own); or both, like the parts of a computer. Their 
joint achievement may be either a function that can be performed only together (e.g. 
a calculation) or a new entity they jointly bring about (e.g. a bookshelf on a bookcase, 
a computer, or a baryon (consisting of three quarks)). The nature of the achievement 
will determine whether the result is a new function or a new entity.4 In the case of matter 
and form, if they are thought to be incomplete in a complementary way, the achieve-
ment of their mutual completion is a new entity. The difference between them and the 
case of the baryon is that the fusion between the quarks is physical, by means of a 
physical bond; but the fusion of matter and form is metaphysical, and this has to be 
explained.
Aristotle however, I argue, did not distinguish the two ways, physical and metaphys-
ical, in which a compound object is formed. This conflation (which Lowe too did not 
see) is perpetuated in much contemporary metaphysics. On the one hand, Aristotle 
says that the substantial form is responsible for the physical formation and constitu-
tion of a substance; he writes that since ‘substances [. . .] are formed naturally and in 
accordance with their nature, [. . .] it would appear that this nature is their substance’ 
(namely their substantial form) (Metaphysics VII 17, 1041b, 29–30, my emphasis). On 
the other hand, the substantial form determines what a substance is, where all the con-
stituents of the substance are defined by their functional role in the substance, assigned 
to them by the substantial form; Aristotle writes that ‘we shall define each part [of a 
substance], if we define it well, not without reference to its function’ (ibidem, 1035b, 
16–18, my emphasis). On my reading of Aristotle, it follows that the substantial form is 
responsible both, for the constituents of the substance being physically structured as 
they are in the substance; but also for the constituents making up a whole whose parts 
are defined in terms of the nature of the whole.5 So a particular substance is both phys-
ically constituted the way it is in virtue of its substantial form; and it is a metaphysically 
united whole of a particular sort in virtue of the substantial form. The substantial form 
plays, for Aristotle, both, a physical and metaphysical unifying role; Aristotle runs these 
together as if one, as the quotation below illustrates; and since Aristotle, the two roles 
have not been teased apart in metaphysics:
[I]t would seem that this [what unifies the constituents of a substance] [. . .] is something, and 
not an element, and that it is the cause that makes this thing flesh and that a syllable [i.e. what 
sort they are]. And similarly in all other cases. And this is the substance [essence/nature] of 
each thing (for this is the primary cause of its being); and since [. . .] substances are formed 
4 Note that these two types of emergence, that of a novel property (function) versus that of a novel entity, 
are often run together in the literature.
5 See my ‘Aristotle’s hylomorphism without reconditioning’, Philosophical Inquiry, Volume 37, Issue 1/2, 
2013, pp. 5–22.
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[physically] in accordance with a nature of their own and by a process of nature, their substance 
would seem to be this kind of ‘nature’ [i.e. form], which is not an element but a principle.
(Metaphysics VII 17, 1041b, 25–31; my emphasis)
Notwithstanding this ambiguity in Aristotle’s claim that the substantial form unifies a 
substance into a whole, his account of hylomorphic composition withstands philo-
sophical scrutiny. As I argued elsewhere, following Scaltsas (1994), I take Aristotle to 
hold that being unified into a whole re-identifies the parts into being what they cannot 
be apart from the whole. The parts are re-identified according to the unifying principle 
of the whole, the substantial form. Once re-identified, they have no distinctness in the 
substance; they exist in it holistically.6 If they were severed from the whole, they would 
lose their functional identity, which is conferred to them by the form, on the basis of 
their role in the whole substance. Thus, if severed, the parts would lose their form and 
become like (originative) matter is to the substance it can constitute (e.g. like extract-
ing marble from a statue).7
Does Aristotle’s hylomorphism require any sort of ‘reconditioning’? My view is that 
it does not; yet, there have been many recent attempts in current metaphysics to ‘recon-
dition’ Aristotle’s views by rejecting one or the other of the premises on which his hylo-
morphism is based. Lowe too, however, among others, offers a way of ‘reconditioning’ 
Aristotle’s hylomorphism, by jettisoning matter from the ontology, on the ground that 
he considers matter an unintelligible notion.8 Lowe illustrates his view by means of the 
following example:
When . . . the electron is captured by the proton and occupies an orbit around it, then indeed we 
have a new concrete object of a very different kind: a hydrogen atom . . . In the newly created 
hydrogen atom, the proton remains exactly what it was before, just a proton, and the electron 
remains just an electron. A new form is instantiated . . . The form does not, in any sense I can 
understand, ‘combine’ with the proton and the electron as to constitute with them the atom. 
The only things that do any ‘combining’ are the proton and the electron.
(2012, 237, emphasis in the original)
It is clear that this reconditioned account has no room for the Aristotelian notion of 
matter; there is no metaphysical job for it to do. On Lowe’s way of thinking about the 
given example, the proton and the electron are there before and after the creation of the 
hydrogen atom: there is no need for a material continuant that takes on a new form 
when a new substance is created, because the proton and the electron can do this by 
combining, when the composite is created.
6 What can be extracted from the whole exists in it only potentially, in the sense that it derives from it.
7 A key text for this conclusion is where Aristotle describes his Homonymy Principle, in the Metaphysics:
[The parts of a substance] cannot even exist if severed from the whole; for it is not a finger in any state that 
is the finger of a living thing, but the dead finger is a finger only homonymously. (1035b, 24–5, last emphasis 
added)
8 Lowe writes: ‘I have no serious need for the hylemorphist category of matter’ (2012, p. 237).
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This proposed reconditioning of hylomorphism is not however free of difficulties. 
The main one arises with the claim it makes that the generation of a new substance 
leaves the constituting components as they were (e.g. when the hydrogen atom forms, 
the proton and the electron remain what they were before making up the atom). For 
Aristotle, a hydrogen atom is, at best, an instance of a substance, but not a model for 
understanding the metaphysics of substance; reconditioned hylomorphism cannot 
help us understand the generation of a new entity (e.g. of flesh out of bread and water). 
How do bread and water come to constitute flesh when we feed ourselves? Aristotle’s 
solution, as I have argued elsewhere and briefly indicated here above, is that bread and 
water undergo a radical qualitative and functional change when they make up flesh—a 
change such that they are no longer identifiable as bread and water once they constitute 
flesh. But what could one say in answer to the above question if one endorses Lowe’s 
model? One might want to argue that ultimately bread and water are protons and elec-
trons. (But do we have to assume atomism on a priori grounds because we assume all 
generation is combination?) This move however would not serve to recondition 
Aristotelian hylomorphism, as for Aristotle the ultimate level of reality comprises the 
fundamental powers (hot, cold, wet, and dry) and not a layer of particles (even conced-
ing that protons and electrons are particles of a special kind).9
But independently of the issue of whether Lowe’s account is genuinely a way to 
recondition Aristotle’s hylomorphism or not, a further pressing question that Lowe’s 
account gives rise to is this: how are we to understand the claim that the proton and the 
electron combine into a hydrogen atom? That is, what is the metaphysical difference 
between the proton and the electron on the one hand, and the combined proton and 
electron on the other? It is widely assumed that the difference is not primitive, but 
rather one that metaphysics can explain. Yet does it come down to just a difference of 
being related to each other or not?
3. Whole, but not One
Let us take an electron as an example of a unified entity constituted of parts: its elemen-
tal properties.10 In an ontology (like the one I endorse and I have argued for elsewhere) 
in which such properties are powers, this means that the electron is constituted by its 
elemental powers, such as the power of electric charge, of spin, etc. The question is: what 
is it, metaphysically, for an electron to be constituted by these powers? An electron isn’t 
simply the compresence of powers of charge, spin, mass. These powers are arranged, 
9 See my ‘Potentiality in Aristotle’s Metaphysics’ in K. Engelhard and M. Quante (eds), The Handbook 
of Potentiality (Dordrecht, 2018).
10 Physics offers us a number of ways of understanding the constitution of an electron; but I submit that 
on any of them the electron is defined in terms of elemental properties. In the standard model, an electron 
is an elementary particle that is characterized by certain values of three elementary properties: mass, 
charge, and spin, and exhibits wave-particle behaviour. In quantum field theory, an electron, like all elem-
entary particles, is an excitation state of an underlying physical field; different types (properties) of excita-
tion of the field account for the different types of elementary particle. In string theory, an electron is a 
vibrating string, of the lepton type determining its core structure.
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structured in a particular configuration, when making up an electron; there is at least 
composition, and more, as we have seen in the previous section of this chapter, which 
needs to be explained. I will argue that physical structure unites; while metaphysical 
structure unifies. The former brings about wholes, the latter unities. But wholes are not 
always unities. No degree of organization at the physical level entails metaphysical 
oneness, that it, being one entity. There are in nature aggregates of powers that endure 
and even evolve and develop over time (e.g. an organism); as well as aggregates whose 
component powers are functionally interconnected (e.g. a computer). Such aggregates 
of physically united powers (in enduring structures, and recurrently enduring ones in 
organic cases) are structurally united through physical causal means, such as attrac-
tion and repulsion of electrons at the fundamental level, etc. All these structures of 
powers exhibit physical continuity and connectedness, synchronically and often dia-
chronically, too; but crucially, no particular instance of physical structure, here and 
now, can unify the structured powers metaphysically into one. A set of powers that are 
merely physically united are a plurality of many, just like the grains of sand on the beach. 
They can even be a one-something, a whole, and still be many, like the class of students 
who are rowdy.11 By contrast, an electron is constituted of a structured plurality of 
powers, but it is further unified and one, and is not identical to the plurality of its 
powers, on any Aristotelian metaphysics. The powers of an electron (its charge, spin, 
and mass), which are physically united into a structure, are also metaphysically unified.
There are countless structures of powers in nature which are (merely) physically 
united. Although some structures are physically more strongly united than others, this 
in itself does not change their standing as merely physical structures. On the other 
hand, some of the physically united structures are also metaphysically unified; for 
instance, a tree, or an organism. What, then, differentiates a merely physically united 
structure of powers from one that is also metaphysically unified? Physical structures 
are ‘numberless’, in the sense that they do not bring with them a count principle. It is an 
open question how many entities a physical structure is, which is not determined by the 
structure, or even the structure’s being a whole. What is merely physically structured 
can be counted as one, or as many entities, or as either (e.g. as one can think of the 
64 chess squares in various ways). I argue that number accrues to physical structures of 
powers on account of their metaphysical unification.
Let us begin with the question of what metaphysical unification is. How does a phys-
ically united structure become unified in such a way as to acquire number, and become 
one? Consider a squad of soldiers. One can think of it as a structured plurality of soldiers 
or a whole of many; but also, one can think of it/them as a single army unit. Similarly, a 
swarm of bees can be thought of as a structured plurality of insects, or as a single super-
organism. What is the difference? My claim is that the difference between a structured 
plurality and a single individual it may constitute lies in the dependencies that develop 
between the components of the structure. Unification of structured components into a 
11 The reasoning is the same as W. V. O. Quine’s (1960) when he argues that what instantiates a rabbit 
instantiates just as much un-detached rabbit parts.
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single individual involves more than ontological dependence of the parts on the whole; 
it involves ontological-cum-definitional dependence, namely holistic dependence.
How does a component in a physical structure (e.g. a power) become holistically 
dependent on the whole-structure-as-a-single-individual? The transformation demands 
a change in the criteria of individuation applied to the power, which results in a change 
in the power’s ontological status. Consider the electric charge of an electron; the power 
is re-individuated as a way of being of the electron, and is no longer a discrete entity in 
the whole structure. It is not, anymore, an electric charge which is compresent with 
spin, mass, etc.; rather it is the electrically charged electron. An individual emerges 
from a structure of powers, as the structured powers cease being discrete parts in the 
structure and become qualifications of the individual.12
The view is then this: a physical structure of powers is a whole—an aggregate of 
many powers. When it is metaphysically unified, it becomes a single entity, which 
bears these powers as its own properties. The ‘one’ that emerges is a subject (e.g. an 
electron), characterized by its constituents as its qualifications (e.g. being charged). 
I  call such unification metaphysical unity. The discrete constituents of a physical 
structure come to constitute a subject by becoming properties of the subject, and are 
henceforth individuated as such, namely, as ‘of the subject’, dependent on it, rather 
than as discrete entities.13 They are dependent on the subject for what each of them is 
(i.e. as the type of qualification of the subject each of them is). This holds of all types 
of constituents of a subject, whether abstract or concrete, particular or universal; 
they are not compresent in the subject, but unified as ways the subject is. In this 
sense, the subject is constituted of the physical structure of powers that makes it up, 
but acquires a new metaphysical structure, changing from being an aggregate of 
many powers (or other types of constituent) to being an individual subject, a sub-
stance, qualified by these powers.14
I submit that the metaphysical transition from a united physical structure of powers 
to a unified powerful subject is achieved by a holistic re-individuation of the constituents 
of the structure, in accordance with either sortal or mass individuation principles. 
The sortal or mass individuation principles dictate the type of entity that is individu-
ated by the criteria they set for being that entity. Oneness of entity is generated by the 
dependence of the parts on the whole. Sortal and mass predicates enable science to 
‘carve’ the world in ways that explain what happens in the world. Alternative carvings 
of the world deliver alternative numbers of entities in the world, and alternative 
12 Each qualification can be individuated by abstraction from the individual; this involves division of the 
individual by abstraction, which I have discussed elsewhere. [Reference omitted because the paper is under 
peer review.]
13 By ‘discrete’ here I mean that they are entities which can be individuated without reference to other 
individuals.
14 What follows is that the powers in the physical structure that constitutes the subject are not identical 
to the qualifications of powerfulness that come to thereby characterize the subject. The holism of the sub-
ject changes their ontological status from discrete components to its own qualifications.
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explanations of what happens in the world. The ultimate alternatives are classified 
into two general types of ontology: extensional mereologists (such as David Lewis) 
see pluralities, where substantialists (myself included) see emergent unities. Where 
the mereologists see structured compresence, the substantialists see holistic dependence. 
These alternative ontologies derive from alternative individuation principles for 
entities in the world, and dependencies between them.
4. Structural versus Substantial Powers
The building blocks of all there is in nature are instances (tropes) of physical powers. 
They occur in nature in physical structures of dependencies. I have argued that such 
structures unite the powers together, but do not unify them metaphysically into indi-
vidual entities. On the other hand, there exist a small number of physical structures of 
powers that are also metaphysically unified into individual entities, on account of the 
way their constituents are individuated. Thus, for instance, an electron is one entity, 
not on account of its being physically structured, but on account of the way the powers 
in the structure are holistically individuated into qualifications of the electron. The 
physical structure of the electron’s powers constitutes the electron, but is not the electron. 
The electron is a single emergent (exercising) power, constituted of a physical structure 
of powers—mass, spin, charge, and space–time—which are holistically composed 
into one emergent entity, the electron, under the individuation principle of the sortal 
‘electron’. I call the structure of powers constituting an emergent entity a structural power 
that can be conceived of plurally; the electron is constituted of a structural power—the 
structure of mass, spin, charge, space–time. The unification of the structural power of 
electron into one is derivative from the metaphysical oneness of the electron. In itself, the 
structural power of electron is a structure of powers; it is a whole of many powers. Is it 
a power? Strictly, no; it is many powers; a powerful whole made of many powers. On the 
other hand, the single power of electron emerges from the unification of the physical 
structure of powers into a single individual; I call the emergent power of electron a 
substantial power. This is constituted of the structure of powers of the electron, but 
which are now re-individuated as qualifications of a subject according to the principle 
of the sortal ‘electron’.
So why differentiate between a structural power and a substantial power? Isn’t the 
substantial power of electron sufficient for understanding what type of power the elec-
tron is? The reason for differentiating them is twofold. On the one hand, the structural 
power is what constitutes the electron; whereas the substantial power is the electron. 
On the other, the differentiation between the structural power of electron and the sub-
stantial power of electron enables us to understand the relation between the exten-
sional mereological conception of the electron (as a whole of many interrelated powers); 
and the substantialist conception of the electron (as an individual emergent power). 
The constitution relation turns the powers in the electron’s physical structure into 
properties of the emergent substantial power. Although every structure of powers 
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could be thought of as a structural power, I reserve the term ‘structural power’ for 
those structures of powers which constitute substantial powers. (Thus, for instance, 
the winds around me are not a structural power, although they are structured.) Every 
science individuates its own individual subjects or substances, and hence its own sub-
stantial powers (i.e. the entities that the science needs to describe and investigate real-
ity within its own domain of inquiry). These structural powers are holistically unified, 
top-down,15 according to the individuation principles of the respective concepts 
which figure in the scientific laws and explanations of the science in question.
Top-down unification gives rise to downward emergence of components. For the 
substantialist (and for Aristotle), the ultimate components individuated at the ground 
level are dependent for what they are on the whole they belong to. So even in the 
extreme case of a general who treats a squad of soldiers as a single superorganism, 
the soldiers become (for all intents and purposes in that general’s army) properties 
of the squad-organism. In the case of a dog, the substantialist treats it as one organ-
ism constituted of the structural (causal) unitedness of its components. These 
same reasons do not, by contrast, incline the mereologist to treat the dog as one 
individual, rather than as a sum of components. For the substantialist, the individu-
ation concepts facilitate the top-down unification of structural powers, imposing 
dependence relations of the powers on the emergent subject. The difference 
between the two ways of individuating a dog is that on both, there is the structural 
power of the dog. But while the work of the mereologist stops here, when she identi-
fies the dog with the structural power, which is an aggregate of interrelated powers, 
the substantialist goes further; she turns structured aggregates into individuals; the 
structural power of dogness comes to constitute a substantial power, the dog, as a 
diachronic power.
The difference between structural powers and substantial powers has not been 
placed on the map in the history of metaphysics or in current metaphysics so far. As we 
have seen, on the contrary, Aristotle claimed that in substances, the formal cause 
(namely the substantial form, e.g. being a tiger) is the same as the efficient cause of the 
substance (e.g. the physically generative power of a substance; it’s as if the substantial 
power of a substance were the same as the structural power of a substance. This has 
been held as an important insight of Aristotle, which has been repeated over the ages as 
an explanation of the physical oneness together with the metaphysical oneness of a 
substance. But Aristotle was (dare I say it?!) wrong to identify the formal and efficient 
causes of a substance. I have argued here that structural powers do not entail substan-
tial powers, but only vice versa; and that structural powers constitute substantial 
powers, through the re-individuation of their components according to holistic sortal 
or mass principles (e.g. for dogs or lava).
15 In contrast with the bottom-up unification that structural powers bring about.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 09/10/2018, SPi
whole, but not one 69
5. Conclusion
In this paper, I have examined the issue of the unity of objects from the viewpoint 
(which I endorse) that the ultimate constituents of reality are instances (i.e. tropes) of 
physical powers. Powers compose in two different ways, physically and metaphysically. 
When physically united they make up wholes, which are plural; when metaphysically 
unified they make up unities, which are one. The unification results from the sortal 
concepts we use to individuate structures of powers into entities, that is, single subjects 
that are qualified by the powers that constitute them as parts. I argued that structural 
powers are physically united, while substantial powers are metaphysically unified. No 
physical relation can unify a structure into one, but only into plural wholes. The unifi-
cation into one is a further step which results from the holistic, top-down individuation 
of the constituents of a structural power into a single entity—downward emergence 
of components. Hence, whereas wholeness results from physical relations, oneness 
results from conceptual individuation. Conceptual individuation is justified either on 
scientific grounds, for the expediency of explanation, or on pragmatic grounds, for 
other kinds of expediency.
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